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Abstract—From the date that a domain name is registered with 
a registrar, there should be a pattern in the amount of time it 
takes for that domain to be actively resolved on the Internet.  We 
first attempt to describe that pattern in general terms by 
correlating data from registries for several top-level domains and 
a large passive DNS data source.  This pattern is then used as a 
baseline for a comparison with the pattern of activity in domains 
that malicious software utilizes.  While our quantitative results 
are not to be considered representative of the patterns exhibited 
by all types of malware, the malicious domains are found to have 
a significantly different pattern than the standard domains. 
 
Index Terms—measurement studies, passive DNS, SIE, 
malware and the DNS. 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
OMAIN names must be registered for use before they are 
accessed via the domain name system (DNS).  Companies 
and individuals generally do business with registrars, who 
collect the necessary information and payment and then pass 
the new domain off to the appropriate registry.   Both 
malicious and legitimate domains must be registered through 
this same process; however it is reasonable to suspect that 
there will be different patterns of behavior between the two 
types of domains. 
 To date, it seems that this correlation has not been made in 
general, and so a baseline pattern of behavior for the Internet 
in general must be established before any deviation from this 
norm could be measured.  If the pattern discovered for 
malicious domains is sufficiently different from the average, 
then the hope is that this difference could become part of a 
method for detecting malicious domains before they do 
damage, rather than retroactively.    
II. PROCEDURE  
A. Preparation 
We collect data from a high-volume passive DNS source at 
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the Security Information Exchange (SIE)[1].  This is a near-
real-time feed of data collected from several high-volume DNS 
servers distributed throughout the Internet.  The location of the 
sensors is not public, and so the bias introduced by the 
location of the sensors is not calculable.  However there is 
some bias introduced, and this data cannot claim to capture all 
DNS data on the internet.  Regardless, the SIE data represents 
the most comprehensive DNS data source available at this 
time. There is reason to believe the data is a sufficient sample 
size to move forward with.  Reference [2] demonstrates that 
the SIE data provided visibility to resource records (RRs) for 
about 93% of the domain labels immediately under the .edu 
top-level domain (TLD) in a 2-week observation period.   
Further attempts were made to measure the 
representativeness of the SIE data.  The data is delivered in the 
nmsg format, and each message contains the IP address of the 
machine that sent the response.  Counting the unique number 
of these IP addresses, and also to which autonomous system 
number (ASN) they belong, delivers some measure of the 
diversity of the responses captured by the SIE.  Samples were 
taken for March 11 and 16, 2011 from channel 207; channel 
207 reduces data volume by deduplicating exact copies of 
messages and incrementing a counter in the nmsg format. This 
does not affect the number of unique IP addresses observed. 
Over these two days, 1.56 x 109 nmsg messages were 
observed.  The IPv4 addresses were simply extracted and 
counted.  For the ASNs, the IP addresses were correlated using 
a comprehensive mapping of ASN to IP that CERT maintains 
internally and is updated daily.  Correlation and storage 
utilized the SiLK toolset. 
In generating the lists of newly active domains we reduce 
the SIE feed to a list of all of the unique RRs observed for a 
given day.  These lists of RRs are then further processed in 
order to generate a list of all of the two-label domains (e.g. 
example.com) that were observed for the first time in our data 
collection on the current day.  In order to provide a baseline 
for what was new each day, we calculated the new two-label 
domains every day starting June 1, 2010. 
We collect zone data for the biz, com, info, mobi, and net 
top-level domains on a daily basis.  From this data, we use a 
Bloom filter to create a list of the newly registered domains for 
that top-level domain (TLD) for a given day.  For the month of 
October 2010, there were 2,783,497 domains registered in the 
TLDs that we have data for.   
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Thirdly, we collect information about domain names that are 
related to malicious code.  Within CERT, malicious code is 
collected and analyzed in the artifact catalogue [3].  Some of 
the results include the domain names that the malware attempts 
to resolve.  This data makes up the corpus of the malware-
related domains that we study.  Data is available for both the 
third and fourth quarters of the 2010 calendar year.  Of the 
146,856 unique domains observed, 4,729 (3.2%) were found 
in the SIE data and could be correlated with zone registration 
files.  The SIE database is indexed on domain names, and so is 
more efficient for these types of look ups.  The SIE database 
zone file information reaches back to April 2010.  However it 
only has TLD zone files and does not have zone files for every 
TLD, but instead seems to be similar to our zone file data in 
containing generic TLD data.  This also excludes dynamic 
DNS services from evaluation.  This is a potential bias in the 
evaluation, because we can only calculate the latency for those 
malware which happen to successfully lookup domains in 
these generic TLDs.  The registration-request delay was 
calculated for each domain which had an entry.     
B. Evaluation 
Once these lists are generated, the list of newly registered 
domains for a given day is correlated with the lists of new 
second-level domains.  This is done several months after the 
domains were registered to allow for sufficient chance that the 
domains are actively resolved on the Internet.  For each 
domain on the registered list, the lists of new second-level 
domains are searched, and the day for which it is found, if any, 
is recorded.  Currently, the domains registered on October 1 
through October 31, 2010, have been evaluated for active 
lookups occurring between August 1, 2010 and January 24, 
2010.   
The dates for malware domain collection and evaluation are 
a superset of those for the general case.  Malware reports are 
organized by when they were analyzed.  Both the Q3 and Q4 
domains have been evaluated by checking the entries in the 
SIE DNS database.  The domains on the list for each quarter 
are searched for in the database and those with a zone time 
first seen and a DNS packet time first seen are evaluated. 
Additionally, the domains observed in Q4 that happen to have 
been registered in October 2010 are available for correlation 
with the general data from the zone files.   
The data for the number of days that transpired between 
registration and lookup are then summarized with some 
statistics and counts. 
III. RESULTS 
Results for the diversity of the of the SIE data are encouraging, 
however not exhaustive.  For March 11, 2011 788,998 unique 
IPv4 addresses were observed, which represented 181, or 
70.7%, of the /8 CIDR blocks.  802,324 unique addresses were 
observed March 16, which covered 180, or 70.3%, of the /8 
CIDR blocks.  The union of the two sets of IPv4 addresses 
consisted of 875,972, also covering 181 /8 CIDR blocks. 
 The ASN coverage results for March 11 are 24,968 ASNs 
represented by the IPv4 addresses out of 36,551 that were 
routable that day, or 68.3%.  On March 16 24,998 ASNs were 
represented, out of the 36,607 that were routable that day, or 
68.3 %.  The union of the sets of observed ASNs consists of 
25,399 unique ASNs.  The number of unique routable ASNs 
for the two days is 36,678.  69.2% of the routable ASNs were 
represented as the sender of at least 1 DNS response in the SIE 
data on these two days.  These results are summarized in Table 
I.  
 
The results the delay between domain registration date and 
date of first observed valid activity follow a long tail pattern. 
The majority of domains experience their first activity within 
two days of their registration.  There is a tail in both directions 
from the registration time, with (%) of domains being subject 
to a valid DNS query before they were registered.  The only 
exception to the smoothness of the long tail is an unexplained 
increase in the range 79-106 days after registration.  This is 
centered around anomalous DNS activity that was observed on 
the days of January 13-14, 2011. On those days the number of 
domains that were observed to be successfully resolved for the 
first time was an order of magnitude higher than any other day 
in the range of SIE observation from August 1, 2010 to 
January 23, 2011 when collection ceased.  The source of this 
anomaly remains unknown, but it does influence the 
distribution and average latency times for the baseline case of 
domain activity.   
Of the 2,783,497 domains registered in October 2010, 
2,064,091 (74.2%) were observed to have been referenced in 
the SIE DNS traffic in the observation window of August 1, 
2010 to January 23, 2011.  The majority of all observed 
domain names, 52.9%, is resolved within 1 day of the day they 
are registered.  However, relatively few, 4.7%, are resolved on 
the same day they are registered.  The number of domains that 
becomes active a given number of days after registration 
decays logarithmically.   
The registration data for the domains the malware attempts 
to connect to can be partitioned in multiple ways.  These 
different partitions can yield significantly different 
interpretations of the data.  On the one hand, if one considers 
the domains related to code analyzed in Q4 2010, there were 
146,856 unique domains.  The SIE DNS database only had 
zone time data for 4,729 of these domains.  On the other hand, 
one could consider the domains relevant to the artifact 
catalogue that happen to have been registered in October.  This 
approach makes 504 domains available for analysis.  In the 
TABLE I 





 /8 CIDR 
blocks (% of 
total) 
Unique ASNs (% of 
total routable) 
March 11, 
2011 788,998 181 (70.7%) 24,968 (68.3%) 
March 16, 
2011 802,324 180 (70.3%) 24,998 (68.3%) 
Total 
unique 875,972 181 (70.7%) 25,399 (69.2%) 
 The number of IP addresses and ASNs that the SIE DNS data observes 
DNS responses coming from over the course of two days. 
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first case, an statistically indistinguishable percentage (33.2%) 
of the observed malicious domains is first resolved in the 
timeframes 50-95 days after they are registered and on the 
same day they are registered.  In the case of October-registered 
malicious domains, a large majority, 73.0%, are observed on 
the same day they are registered. 
 Table II displays the delay time between registration of a 
domain and the first DNS response observed for all second-
level domains for which we have registration data.  It is 
expressed as both a percentage of all of the domains that were 
registered in October 2010 and as a percentage of those 
domains for which DNS messages were observed.  Table III 
contains similar data for the subset of domains observed to be 
queried by malware in the malware database.  Table III 
partitions this data both on those domains analyzed during Q4 
2010 and the subset of those domains which were registered in 
October 2010. For both tables, the 99% confidence interval for 




 Table III does not relate data in regards to the total number 
of domains observed from the artifact catalogue.  This would 
have cluttered the data over much because of the number of 
domains with features that the SIE DNS database does not 
have registration data for and factors associated with malicious 
domain behavior.  Many pieces of malware look up a vast 
number of domains, only very few of which are intended to be 
resolved.  Malware which exhibited this behavior is excluded 
from the sample of domains so that it would not overly bias the 
sample.  It is excluded on the basis that if one piece of 
malware associated with a single MD5 hash is associated with 
250 or more domain names, that MD5 and those domains 
names were not included in the study.  This reduced the 
number of unique domain names in question from 146,856 to 
33,795.  Of these, 9,872 contained only two labels.  Since both 
our zone file data set and the SIE database’s zone file data 
contain only top level domains, the only domain names that 
could be in the data are those with two labels.  Of these 9,872 
two-label domains, 4,729 were found in the SIE database to 
have an entry for the time first observed in a zone file.  The 
percentages for domains observed in Q4 in table III are 
calculated from these 4,729 domains.   
 The behavior between the set of domains obtained from 
malware and the set of domains generally is significantly 
different.  The only case in which the 99% confidence 
intervals overlap is between the general case and the case of 
domains observed in Q4 which were registered in October.  
Between these two sets, the time interval of 11-50 days has 
overlapping ranges.  3.7% of domains generally fall in to this 
range, while between 1.2 and 5.2% of artifact-catalogue-
related domains registered in October fall in to this range.  All 
other latency bins between the general registration’s latencies 
and the activity latency of the malware exhibited statistically 
significant differences. 
IV. DISCUSSION 
The domains represented by those from the artifact catalogue 
represent a particular type of malicious domain.  In general, 
these are attempts to connect with a command and control 
server or drop box.  These are essentially surreptitious 
activities.  As such, they would be expected to behave 
differently than a phishing or drive-by-download malicious 
site, and this research should not be conflated as to seem to 
present a picture of all malicious domains.  The malicious 
domains analyzed also represent a much smaller sample size, 
and we have no clear way to understand the bias that our 
sample may have.  This is unlike the SIE data, which we have 
at least made an attempt to clarify the sampling bias. 
Since the number of domains not observed varies so widely 
between the general and malware domains, it is more 
instructive to compare the time delays based on the percentage 
of the domains actually observed for a given delay.  Malicious 
domains demonstrate a significantly different pattern of 
observed request delays than the general domains for every set 
of times.  However, even within our one sample set, it is not 
clear in which way the malicious domains differ.  In one case, 
they are activated much more quickly, and in another case they 
are activated much more slowly.   
Further research will be necessary to better describe the 
domain life cycle patterns of different types of malicious 
domains.  Once this research is accomplished, it could be 
utilized in order to help prevent the use of malicious domains 
before they become active.  If many of the malicious domains 
are inactive for a long period of time after their registration, 
proactive registrars could keep track of which domains are 
TABLE III 
DNS REQUEST DELAY FOR MALICIOUS DOMAINS 
Days % of domains observed in Q4, all registration dates 
% of domains observed 
with October registration 
dates 
90-10 prior 0% 0.0% 
10-0 prior 1.1% (0.7%,1.5%) 0.8% (0%,1.8%) 
Same day 33.2% (31.4%,34.9%) 73.0% (68.0%,78.0%) 
1 9.6% (8.5%,10.7%) 19.4% (15.0%,23.9%) 
2 1.7% (1.2%,2.2%) 1.8% (0.3%,3.3%) 
3 - 10 3.0% (2.4%,3.7%) 1.6% (0.2%,3.0%) 
11 - 50 10.4% (9.2%,11.5%) 3.2% (1.2%,5.2%) 
50-95 33.2% (31.5%,34.9%) 0.2% (0%, 0.7%) 
95+ 7.8% (6.9%,8.8%) 0.0% 
Not observed N/A N/A 
  Results for the malicious population of domain names observed Q4 2010.  
Only reports on two-label domains for which there were zone time observed 
values in the SIE DNS database.  Values in parentheses indicate the range for 
the .99 confidence interval of the observed data. 
TABLE II 
DNS REQUEST DELAY FOR DOMAINS GENERALLY 
Days % of domains registered % of domains observed  
90-10 prior 1.8% 2.4% (2.4%,2.4%) 
10-0 prior 1.4% 1.9% (1.9%,1.9%) 
Same day  3.5% 4.7% (4.7%,4.7%) 
1  35.8% 48.2% (48.1%,48.3%) 
2  15.8% 21.3% (21.2%, 21.4%) 
3 - 10  11.3% 15.2% (15.1%, 15.3%) 
11 - 50  2.7% 3.7% (3.7%, 3,7%) 
50-95 1.7% 2.2% (2.2%, 2.2%) 
95+ 0.3% 0.4% (0.4%, 0.4%) 
Not observed 25.8% N/A 
 Results for the general population of domain names in biz, com, info, 
mobi, and net registered October 1-31, 2010.  Values in parentheses indicate 
the range for the .99 confidence interval of the observed data. 
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utilized after they are registered and potentially make de-
registration decisions based on this data.  The current data 
does not currently support in which manner that de-registration 
decision should be made.   This research does indicate that a 
domain’s pattern of activity in DNS traffic after its registration 
date is a valid area to search for such differences. 
The comparison presented here is only an example 
comparison.  Future work hopes to track how this distribution 
tends to change over time within the general internet domain 
population over time, among a wider set of TLDs, and with 
different sets of potentially malicious domains.     
V. CONCLUSION 
We believe that the information about the standard 
resolution patterns of domain names is potentially of utility to 
anyone performing analysis of DNS behavior.  We hope that 
this baseline information can continue to be updated and 
standardized such that other researchers will be able to build 
upon this information.  Furthermore, the indication that 
malicious domains resolve significantly differently than the 
average domain from their time of registration gives security 
researchers and domain managers another datum with which to 
attempt to identify and prevent malicious domains from 
causing damage.   
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